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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine that you are the parent of an infant child suffering under the effects of a 
medical condition that is treatable, but potentially fatal.  Suppose further that the 
health care provider you have contracted with to provide critical services necessary 
for your child’s welfare negligently fails to act in a manner that would prevent the 
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condition from worsening and your child dies.  It is clear that the medical condition 
was a cause of your child’s death, but timely action by the health care provider might 
have prevented the tragedy.  Does the child’s estate have a viable cause of action 
sounding in tort against the health care provider,1 and if so how do you determine the 
damages?  The answer depends, in large part, upon probabilities.  What was the 
probability your child would have died even if the health care provider had not acted 
negligently?  What was the probability of survival after the negligent failure to act by 
the health care provider?  What if these probabilities are unknown or unknowable?   
Prior to the 1996 Ohio Supreme Court decision in Roberts v. Ohio Permanente 
Med. Group, Inc.,2 if your child had a less than 50% chance of survival before the 
negligent act, under Ohio law there would be no cause of action.3  In Roberts, the 
court changed direction and recognized a plaintiff’s cause of action for the loss of a 
less-than-even chance of recovery or survival.4 However, Roberts leaves unanswered 
some important questions and has caused a great deal of confusion among courts, 
scholars, and practicing lawyers. In particular, Roberts has left uncertainty as to 
whether, under Ohio law, the loss-of-chance doctrine is merely a change in the 
standard of causation or whether it has created an entirely new compensable injury.5  
                                                                
1Causes of action for wrongful death are in the hands of the decedent’s estate.  Action for 
Wrongful Death, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (West 2002), states: 
When the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default which 
would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if 
death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued, 
or the administrator or executor of the estate of such person, as such administrator or 
executor, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the 
person injured and although the death was caused under circumstances which make it 
aggravated murder, murder, or manslaughter. When the action is against such 
administrator or executor, the damages recovered shall be a valid claim against the 
estate of such deceased person. No action for the wrongful death of a person may be 
maintained against the owner or lessee of the real property upon which the death 
occurred if the cause of the death was the violent unprovoked act of a party other than 
the owner, lessee, or a person under the control of the owner or lessee, unless the acts 
or omissions of the owner, lessee, or person under the control of the owner or lessee 
constitute gross negligence. 
When death is caused by a wrongful act, neglect, or default in another state or 
foreign country, for which a right to maintain an action and recover damages is given 
by a statute of such other state or foreign country, such right of action may be enforced 
in this state. Every such action shall be commenced within the time prescribed for the 
commencement of such actions by the statute of such other state or foreign country. 
The same remedy shall apply to any such cause of action now existing and to 
any such action commenced before January 1, 1932, or attempted to be commenced in 
proper time and now appearing on the files of any court within this state, and no prior 
law of this state shall prevent the maintenance of such cause of action.  
2Roberts, 668 N.E.2d 480 (Ohio 1996), overruling Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of 
Cincinnati, Inc. 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971). 
3Cooper, 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971) overruled by Roberts, 668 N.E.2d 480. 
4See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 481. “The time has come to discard the traditionally harsh 
view we previously followed and to join the majority of states that have adopted the loss-of-
chance theory.” Id. at 484. 
5See id. at 481.   
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This Note will examine specific language used in the Roberts decision and the law in 
Ohio after Roberts.   
The central argument advanced in this Note is that a loss of chance should be 
recognized as an independent injury.  This approach best serves the policy of the new 
loss of chance doctrine, and it avoids the very significant doctrinal problems that 
arise if the alternative approach is taken, which is to treat the compensability of lost 
chances as merely a relaxation of traditional tort law causation requirements.  The 
primary focus of this Note is on the loss of a less-than-even chance of recovery or 
survival,6 wherein a victim will be entitled to damages resulting from the negligent 
reduction of the chance of avoiding adverse physical consequences that followed the 
defendant’s negligent act or omission.7   
Part II of this note discusses the historical development of the loss-of-chance 
doctrine and observes that this allegedly new doctrine of loss-of-chance can be 
traced back much further than most scholars and courts generally recognize.  Judge 
Learned Hand used the loss-of-chance rationale over forty years before the case most 
often credited with establishing the doctrine.8  Part II also presents an overview of 
the three primary approaches employed by various jurisdictions in dealing with the 
tortiously destroyed loss-of-chance situation.  In addition, Part II discusses why the 
loss-of-chance doctrine has been limited almost exclusively to cases of medical 
malpractice and why the doctrine is not likely to expand beyond this area of tort law 
in the future.  This fact in itself turns out to have policy consequences relevant to the 
argument presented in this Note.  Finally, Part II presents and scrutinizes the holding 
in Roberts.  
Part III discusses the doctrinal problem left unresolved by Roberts (i.e., the injury 
vs. causation dilemma). Part III also examines how Ohio courts have applied Roberts 
in subsequent cases and how the lack of clear guidance by the Ohio Supreme Court 
has led lower courts to interpret Roberts incorrectly and inconsistently. Finally, Part 
                                                                
6In other words, this Note will not discuss the distinct, and much more problematic, 
question of whether Ohio law should compensate lost chances where the victim had better-
than-even chances of experiencing the desired outcome before the defendant’s negligent act.  
In Roberts, the court limited the application of the loss-of-chance doctrine to cases where the 
victim initially had a less than 50% chance of survival before the health care provider’s 
negligent act or omission. See id. at 481.  However, at least one prominent scholar has 
advocated applying the loss-of-chance doctrine in all cases of tortiously reduced loss-of-
chance regardless of the victim’s chances of survival before the negligent act or omission. See 
generally Joseph H. King, “Reduction of Likelihood” Reformulation and Other Retrofitting of 
the Loss-of-A-Chance Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 491, 492 (1998) [hereinafter King, 
Reformulation]. 
7This Note addresses loss-of-chance of recovery or survival when it is manifested in a 
physical result.  Questions concerning the doctrine’s applicability can arise in the context of a 
claim for future damages, medical monitoring, and mental distress (frequently in the context 
of toxic torts). However, a discussion of the application of the doctrine in those cases is 
beyond the scope of this Note and is covered extensively by other authors.  See, e.g., John C.P. 
Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625 (2002); Robert L. 
Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 
52 MD. L. REV. 951 (1993). 
8Compare Zinnel v. United States Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 10 F.2d 47 (2d 
Cir. 1925), with Hicks v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966). 
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III recommends clarifying the definition of the injury as the loss-of-chance itself and 
clarifying the standard of causation as the traditional preponderance standard. 
Part III.D addresses anticipated counterarguments to the suggested refinements to 
the loss-of-chance doctrine advocated by this Note. Part IV summarizes the 
recommendations for modifying and clarifying the law concerning loss-of-chance in 
Ohio and concludes the Note.   
II.  OVERVIEW OF LOSS-OF-CHANCE DOCTRINE 
A.  Background 
The nearly universal circumstance in which the loss-of-chance doctrine has been 
employed in the United States has been in the medical malpractice context and 
involves a patient suffering from a preexisting condition.9  The health care provider 
negligently fails to prevent the adverse consequences from progressing (usually from 
a delay in proper diagnosis or treatment) frequently resulting in the loss of the 
patient’s life or permanent disability.10  Under the loss-of-chance doctrine, the 
plaintiff would be compensated for the extent to which the defendant’s negligence 
reduced the plaintiff’s chance of survival or achieving a more favorable outcome.11  
Some scholars and courts see the doctrine primarily as a theory of causation,12 while 
others place more emphasis on the valuation aspect of damages.13  In practice, courts 
have struggled with both problems.14 These problems concerning lost chances must 
be evaluated in light of the traditional requirements to maintain a cause of action for 
negligence.   
                                                                
9See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. n (Tentative Draft 
No. 2, 2002); see also David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 1765, 1800 n.42 (1997).   
10See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 492; see also Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, 
Medical Malpractice: Measure and Elements of Damages in Actions Based on Loss of 
Chance, 81 A.L.R. 4th 485, §1(a) (1990) [hereinafter McMahon, Loss of Chance].  
11See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 492, 545-46. 
12See, e.g., David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 605, 605 (2001) (describing loss-of-chance as a novel theory of causation). 
13See, e.g., Cooper v. Hartman, 533 A.2d 1294 (Md. 1987) (finding that the lost chance 
theory does not create a new tort, but rather a redefinition of damages, so that a plaintiff’s 
compensation for the loss of chance is a percentage of the full amount of damages sustained); 
see generally King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 491, 516-46, 554.  
14See, e.g., Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978) (focusing on loss-of-chance from 
perspective of causation); Delaney v. Cade 873 P.2d 175 (Kan. 1994) (examining cases 
addressing causation aspects of loss-of-chance and valuation of damages aspects of loss-of-
chance); see also John D. Hodson, Annotation, Medical Malpractice: “Loss of Chance” 
Causality 54 A.L.R.4th  10 (1987), for a survey of cases addressing the causation aspect of lost 
opportunity; Martin J. McMahon, Damages for Loss of Chance of Cure, 12 AM. JUR. PROOF OF 
FACTS 3d 621 (1991) [hereinafter McMahon, Damages for Loss of Chance], for a detailed 
discussion of cases dealing with the valuation of damages aspects of lost opportunity.  
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B.  Elements of Negligence–Generally 
Traditionally, to prove medical malpractice, the plaintiff’s claim is based on the 
tort of negligence and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving five elements.15  First, 
the plaintiff must prove the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff/victim.16  In the 
context of loss-of-chance, this duty is often a duty to act to protect the plaintiff 
against some injury from a preexisting condition and is based on a special 
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.17 Second, the plaintiff must 
prove, usually through expert testimony, that the defendant breached his duty (i.e., 
the defendant failed to conform to the relevant standard of care).18  The breach of 
duty in loss-of-chance cases is almost always an act of omission rather than 
commission.19   
The third element the plaintiff must prove is that the defendant’s act or omission 
was the cause in fact of the injury he suffered.20 The plaintiff must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that but-for the defendant’s wrongful conduct the 
injury would not have occurred.21  Satisfaction of the burden of persuasion in a 
normal civil case “requires that the trier of fact find that the existence of the 
proposition to be proved is more probably true than not true.”22  The Roberts court 
stated the general rule in medical malpractice cases under Ohio law “is that the 
plaintiff must prove causation through medical expert testimony in terms of 
probability to establish the injury was, more likely than not, caused by the 
defendant’s negligence.”23  Courts that apply the loss-of-chance doctrine have in 
                                                                
15W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 
(5th ed. 1984). 
16See KEETON, supra note 15, at 164-65; see also James Lockhart, Cause of Action for 
Medical Malpractice Based on Loss of Chance of Cure, 4 COA2d 1, 19 (1994) (the relevant 
standard of care is proven through expert testimony). 
17See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1963-1964 Main Vol.); see also King, 
Reformulation, supra note 6, at 497.  
18See KEETON, supra note 15, at 164-65; see also Lockhart, supra note 16, at 20. 
19See generally McMahon, Loss of Chance, supra note 10. 
20See KEETON, supra note 15, at 164-65. 
21See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 497; see also Robertson, supra note 9, 1784 
(expert testimony is generally required to establish but-for causation in medical cases).  Courts 
often emphasize that it is a mistake to insist on too much certainty when applying the but-for 
test especially when the plaintiff relied upon the defendant (and the relevant standard of care) 
to protect against injury from the very type of risk to which the plaintiff was exposed. See 
Robertson, supra note 9, at 1774.  In addition, courts have often found “where the negligence 
of the defendant greatly multiplies the chances of accident … and is of a character naturally 
leading to its occurrence, the mere possibility that it might have happened without negligence 
is not sufficient to break the chain of cause and effect.” Id. at 1775. 
22Michael H. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 301.05 (5th ed. 2001). 
23Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 482. 
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most cases modified this element;24 however, it has proven to be perhaps the most 
confusing aspect of the doctrine.   
Fourth, the plaintiff must prove the defendant’s breach of duty was the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff’s injury.25  Proximate cause requires that the injury be within 
the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s breach of duty.26  Although the term 
proximate cause is often mistakenly used as a synonym for causation generally,27 
loss-of-chance cases decided in Ohio have focused primarily on issues of cause in 
fact and proximate cause has not proved troublesome to plaintiffs.28 
Finally, the plaintiff must have suffered a compensable injury.29  This element, 
along with causation, has proven to be the primary challenge to plaintiffs in loss-of-
chance cases.30  In the loss-of-chance context, questions of valuation are frequently 
mistaken as questions of causation.31  Before a plaintiff can establish causation, he 
has to know how to define the injury the defendant’s negligence allegedly caused 
(i.e., the resulting physical injury or the lost chance itself).  As discussed further in 
Part III, in Ohio a significant question exists as to how to define the injury in loss-of-
chance cases.32 
                                                                
24See generally Delaney, 873 P.2d 175 (examining cases from several jurisdictions 
addressing causation aspects of loss-of-chance and valuation of damages aspects of loss-of-
chance); Hodson, supra note 14.  
25See KEETON, supra note 15, at 164-65; see also Lockhart, supra note 16, at 22-23. 
26See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 497. 
27See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 26 REPORTERS’ NOTE cmt. 
a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002). 
28Compare Starkey v. St. Rita’s Med. Ctr., 690 N.E.2d 57, 63 (3d Dist. Ohio Ct. App. 
1997) (interpreting Roberts to mean the plaintiff need not prove by a reasonable probability 
that the defendant’s medical malpractice was the “proximate cause” of plaintiff’s injury), with 
Paul v. Metrohealth St. Luke’s Med. Ctr., No. 71195, 1998 WL 742173, at *7 (8th Dist. Ohio 
Ct. App. Oct. 22, 1998) (finding that the plaintiff’s expert failed to show that defendant’s 
alleged medical malpractice was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury to a degree of 
medical certainty or medical probability as required by Roberts; and holding that Roberts does 
not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving “but-for” causation; and further holding that 
plaintiff’s expert failed to demonstrate that “but-for” defendant’s actions either the risk of 
harm to the decedent was increased or the decedent would have had a “chance of recovery”). 
29See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 497; see also KEETON, supra note 15, at 164-
65. 
30See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 497. 
31Id. at 519.  The confusion is particularly apparent in cases where the victim lost a chance 
of less than 50%.  In applying the loss-of-chance doctrine in this case, the percentage of 
chance lost is relevant for purposes of valuing the plaintiff’s injury.  That same percentage 
should not be the basis of determining whether the plaintiff has met the burden of proving 
causation.  See, e.g., Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 481. 
32See generally Roberts, 668 N.E.2d 480; see discussion infra Part III. 
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C.  Development of the Doctrine of Loss-of-Chance 
Though many courts and scholars trace the roots of the loss-of-chance doctrine in 
the United States to the 1966 Fourth Circuit decision in Hicks v. United States,33 this 
Note contends the doctrine is much older and more eminently placed: it surfaces at 
least as early as a 1925 opinion by Judge Learned Hand in Zinnel v. United States 
Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp.34 Hicks involved a medical malpractice suit 
where the decedent died from an intestinal disorder after being misdiagnosed.35  The 
plaintiff’s experts testified that the decedent would have survived if given proper 
treatment, but the defendant argued there was a failure of causation because even 
with proper treatment, the patient’s survival was speculative.36 The court, in finding 
causation had been established by the plaintiff, stated: 
When a defendant’s negligent action or inaction has effectively terminated 
a person’s chance of survival, it does not lie in the defendant’s mouth to 
raise conjectures as to the measure of the chances that he has put beyond 
the possibility of realization. If there was any substantial possibility of 
survival and the defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable. Rarely is it 
possible to demonstrate to an absolute certainty what would have 
happened in circumstances that the wrongdoer did not allow to come to 
pass. The law does not in the existing circumstances require the plaintiff 
to show to a certainty that the patient would have lived had she been 
hospitalized and operated on promptly.37  
In Hicks, the court noted that both of the plaintiff’s experts testified that the 
victim would have survived if operated on promptly, and the defendant did not 
effectively contradict this testimony.38  Based on this evidence, the plaintiff arguably 
proved that it was more likely than not that the defendant’s negligence caused the 
victim’s death.39  
I would go back further than Hicks, however, in finding similar reasoning used 
by a court to find a plaintiff had established causation sufficient to get to the jury on 
the question of negligence.  In Zinnel, the decedent was a seaman who was swept 
overboard in a storm at sea and he drowned after ineffectual efforts to rescue him.40  
                                                                
33See, e.g., Joseph H. King, Jr., Causation, Valuation, and Chance in Personal Injury 
Torts Involving Preexisting Conditions and Future Consequences, 90 YALE L.J. 1353, 1368 
n.53 (1981) [hereinafter King, Valuation]; see also, Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 482 (citing Hicks 
v. United States, 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966)).  
3410 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1925). 
35See Hicks, 368 F.2d at 626-27. 
36See id. at 629-32. 
37Id. at 632. 
38See id. at 632. 
39See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, Inc., 664 P.2d 474, 491 
(Wash. 1983) (Dolliver, J., dissenting) (finding that, factually, Hicks does not support the loss-
of-chance doctrine because the plaintiff’s chance of survival was over 50%). 
40See Zinnel, 10 F.2d at 47. 
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Judge Learned Hand, in addressing whether the failure by the defendant to maintain 
a safety rope caused the loss, stated:   
There … remains the question whether they might have also said that the 
fault caused the loss.  About that we agree no certain conclusion was 
possible. Nobody could, in the nature of things, be sure that the intestate 
would have seized the rope, or, if he had not, that it would have stopped 
his body. But we are not dealing with a criminal case, nor are we justified, 
where certainty is impossible, in insisting upon it. We cannot say that 
there was no likelihood that a rope three feet above the deck … would not 
have saved the seaman…. Considering that such lines were run for the 
express purpose, among others, of protecting seamen, we think it a 
question about which reasonable men might at least differ whether the 
intestate would not have been saved, had it been there.41 
While not specifically stating that the case was a loss-of-chance for survival case, 
the court in Zinnel used essentially the same reasoning as later courts have used in 
loss-of-chance cases.42   
D.  Various Approaches to the Tortiously Destroyed Loss-of-Chance Situation 
Courts have not uniformly adopted the “substantial possibility” rule of Hicks, 
which permits recovery even if there was only a substantial possibility of avoiding 
the result but-for the tortious conduct.43  Since Hicks, courts have generally followed 
one of three approaches to the tortiously destroyed loss-of-chance situation.   
1.  The Traditional “All or Nothing” Approach 
The traditional approach to evaluating claims of lost chance of a more favorable 
outcome focuses on causation and is known as the “all-or-nothing rule.”44  The 
plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but-for the defendant’s 
negligence the plaintiff would not have suffered the harm.45  This approach is 
essentially the traditional negligence analysis,46 and, while a minority position,47 is 
still followed in several jurisdictions.48  If the plaintiff can prove causation by this 
standard, damages will be awarded to the plaintiff in full (i.e., as though the 
                                                                
41Id. at 49. 
42See, e.g., Hicks, 368 F.2d at 632. 
43See infra Parts II.D.1-3, II.F., and cases cited therein. 
44See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 499. 
45See id.; see also Lockhart, supra note 16, at 14. 
46See Delaney, 873 P.2d at 183. 
47See id. at 183 (stating the traditional approach is probably now the minority position). 
48See, e.g., Williams v. Spring Hill Mem’l Hosp., 646 So. 2d 1373, 1375 (Ala. 1994); 
Jones v. Owings, 456 S.E.2d 371, 374 (S.C. 1995); Abille v. United States, 482 F. Supp. 703 
(N.D. Cal. 1980) (applying Alaska law); Hilden v. Ball, 787 P.2d 1122 (Idaho 1989); Clayton 
v. Thompson, 475 So. 2d 439 (Miss. 1985). 
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likelihood of success was 100%).49  If not, no damages will be awarded.50  This was 
the approach of the Ohio Supreme Court prior to Roberts.  In Cooper v. Sisters of 
Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 51 the court reasoned: 
Lesser standards of proof are understandably attractive in malpractice 
cases where physical well being, and life itself, are the subject of 
litigation.  The strong intuitive sense of humanity tends to emotionally 
direct us toward a conclusion that in an action for wrongful death an 
injured person should be compensated for the loss of any chance for 
survival, regardless of its remoteness. However, we have trepidations that 
such a rule would be so loose that it would produce more injustice than 
justice.52   
Courts utilizing this rule place a great deal of weight upon the policy rationale 
that tort liability should be based on fault and fault is only proven when the 
defendant is more than 50% responsible for causing the injury.53  Additionally, many 
courts may view this standard as being a more manageable and bright line approach 
to resolving these questions. 
The problem with this approach, and the reason a majority of the states have now 
done away with it, is that it ignores the policy objectives of deterrence and 
compensation,54 and places an emphasis on manipulating the rules because it forces 
the parties to search out expert witnesses willing to say what each party needs to 
show under the rule.55 
                                                                
49See King, Valuation, supra note 33, at 1387-90; see generally McMahon, Loss of 
Chance, supra note 10; see also KEETON, supra note 15, § 127, at 945-60 (discussing damages 
under wrongful death statutes). 
50See KEETON, supra note 15, at 164-65; see generally McMahon, Loss of Chance, supra 
note 10. 
51272 N.E.2d 97, 104, overruled by Roberts, 668 N.E.2d 480. In Cooper, the court held 
that plaintiff had the burden to prove the probability of victim’s survival absent the 
defendant’s negligence.  Id.  The court held that probable means more than 50%.  Id. 
52Cooper, 272 N.E.2d at 103, overruled by Roberts, 668 N.E.2d 480. 
53See cases cited supra notes 46-48. 
54See Vincent R. Johnson & Alan Gunn, Studies in American Tort Law 6-9 (2d ed. 1999). 
55See, e.g., De Burkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986) (reasoning that allowing 
recovery for a lost chance, and not for all damages, is the most equitable approach; and further 
reasoning that the all-or-nothing approach subverts deterrence objectives of tort law by 
denying recovery for the effects of conduct that causes statistically demonstrable losses; and 
that by not recognizing a lost chance as a compensable interest, the all-or-nothing rule distorts 
the loss assigning role of tort law and creates pressure to manipulate and distort other rules 
affecting causation and damages, and places a premium on the search for a willing witness).  
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2. Relaxed Proof of Causation Approaches   
Courts following this second approach generally continue to view the underlying 
physical injury or death as the ultimate injury for which the patient is compensated.56  
The relaxed proof approach attempts to ameliorate what some courts view as the 
harshness of the traditional “all-or-nothing approach.”57  In understanding how courts 
can relax the traditional requirements of proving causation, it is useful to look at 
what Professor Joseph H. King has identified as the “four dimensions” of the 
causation requirement.58  The first aspect of causation is the “but-for” test.59  The 
second dimension is the standard of proof, which defines the degree of certainty 
required to establish causation.60  This usually means it was more likely than not that 
the defendant’s tortious conduct caused the plaintiff’s injury.61 Third is the 
sufficiency of the evidence, which, in medical malpractice cases, relates to the 
requirements for expert testimony.62  The final dimension is the burden of proof.63  
The burden of proving causation is normally on the plaintiff, but courts do, under 
certain circumstances, shift the burden to the defendant.64   
Some courts have relaxed either the standard of proof required or the sufficiency 
of the evidence called for65 rather than defining the injury as the loss of chance for a 
better result. A number of courts purporting to adopt some version of loss-of-chance 
have relied on Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 323.66  However, there are 
                                                                
56See, e.g., Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1285-87; see generally Beth Clemens Boggs, Lost Chance 
of Survival Doctrine: Should the Court Ever Tinker with Chance?, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 421, 432 
(1992).   
57See generally Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 688 P.2d. 605 (Ariz. 1984); 
McKellips v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 741 P.2d 467 (Okla. 1987); Mayhue v. Sparkman, 653 
N.E2d 1384 (Ind. 1995); Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 483. 
58See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 497-98. 
59See id. 
60See id. 
61See id. 
62See id. 
63See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 497-98. 
64See Robertson, supra note 9, at 1781. 
65See, e.g., McKellips, 741 P.2d at 475; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. 
PHYSICAL HARM § 26 REPORTERS’ NOTE cmt. n (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002). 
66See, e.g., Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 484; Thompson, 688 P.2d at 615; Hamil v. Bashline, 
392 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978); McKellips, 741 P.2d at 474-75.  In McKellips, the patient 
died shortly after a physician negligently diagnosed the patient’s condition as minor. See 
McKellips, 741 P.2d at 470.  An expert testified that the plaintiff’s chances of survival would 
have been significantly improved if the physician had not been negligent in his diagnosis, but 
the expert could not reduce the lost chance to a statistical probability. See id.  In adopting the 
Section 323 approach, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that if a plaintiff can show the 
physician’s negligence caused a substantial reduction in the plaintiff’s chance of recovery or 
survival, the question of proximate cause is for the jury, regardless of statistical evidence. See 
id. at 474, 477. 
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considerable differences among courts on whether and how juries should be 
instructed under Section 323,67 and in fact significant disagreement often surrounds 
whether a particular case is even a Section 323 case.68  In Roberts, the Ohio Supreme 
Court indicated it recognizes the loss-of-chance theory and will follow the approach 
set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 323.69  Part III of this Note 
discusses some of the problems and confusion with this approach as adopted by the 
court in Roberts.70  
                                                          
Courts and commentators, in fact, call this the Restatement Section 323 approach.  See, 
e.g., Christopher Paul Reuscher, Note, McMullen v. Ohio State University Hospitals: This isn’t 
Vegas, but don’t Tell the Courts—Playing with Percentages and the Loss-Of-Chance 
Doctrine, 34 AKRON L. REV. 767, 777 (2001); Michelle L. Truckor, Comment, The Loss Of 
Chance Doctrine: Legal Recovery for Patients on the Edge of Survival, 24 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
349, 356 (1999); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 26 REPORTERS’ 
NOTE cmt. n (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).  “Section 323(a) was designed to relax a plaintiff’s 
burden of proving causation, not to compound it.” McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 725 
N.E.2d 1117, 1123-24 (Ohio 2000) (citation omitted).  
67Compare Thompson, 688 P.2d at 615-16 (adopting Section 323 and allowing a jury to 
consider evidence of an increase in harm on the issue of causation, but holding this did not 
mean the jury was to be instructed on the rule, rather it was a rule allowing the court to permit 
evidence of an increased risk of harm; and adding that the jury must still be instructed to find 
for the defendant unless it finds a probability the defendant was a cause of the plaintiff’s 
injury), with Jones v. Montefiore Hosp., 431 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1981) (holding that the plaintiff 
was entitled to jury instruction based on Section 323; and that proximate cause could be 
established by evidence that the defendant’s negligent act or failure to act was a substantial 
factor in bringing about the plaintiff’s harm; and adding that medical opinion need only show, 
with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the defendant’s conduct increased the risk 
of harm ultimately sustained and it is then for the jury to decide whether the conduct was a 
substantial factor in bringing about the harm). 
68See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, Inc.,  664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 
1983). In Herskovits, a majority of the Washington Supreme Court found that recovery was 
appropriate on behalf of a deceased patient whose chances of surviving cancer, according to 
expert testimony, had been reduced from 39% to 25% as a result of the defendant’s failure to 
properly diagnose the condition.  See id. at 474 (voting 6-3 in favor of recognizing the 
plaintiff’s cause of action for loss-of-chance).  Two justices, of the six vote majority, held they 
would allow wrongful death damages when the trier of fact found an act, which reduced the 
chance of survival, to be a substantial factor in the death’s occurrence.  Id. at 479.  This view 
could properly be classified as a relaxed standard of proof.  Four justices in the majority, 
however, found that it was the reduced chance of survival itself that was the compensable 
injury.  Id. at 487.  These four justices indicated that because the experts agreed the 
defendant’s negligence probably did not cause the death, damages could not, under established 
principles of causation, be awarded if the injury was the death.  Id. at 481 (Pearson, J., 
concurring).  This view cannot fairly be described as a relaxed causation standard because 
these justices found that the injury (defined as the loss of a less than even chance of survival) 
was more likely than not caused by the defendant’s negligence.  Id. at 487 (Pearson, J., 
concurring). 
69Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 484. 
70See discussion infra Part III.  “Those plaintiffs utilizing this new cause of action no 
longer must prove causation in terms of probability through the medical expert to establish 
that the injury was, more likely than not, caused by the defendant’s negligence.” Starkey, 690 
N.E.2d at 62 (citing Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 482-83).  In Starkey, the court also stated: 
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3.  Pure Loss-of-Chance Approach 
In 1981 Professor King wrote an extremely influential article on this subject 
advocating that lost opportunity should generally be recognized as a legally 
compensable harm and valued on a proportional basis.71  This approach defines the 
injury as the loss of a chance of achieving a more favorable outcome,72 rather than 
the subsequent death or physical injury.  Defining the injury in this manner requires a 
plaintiff to prove only that the defendant’s act or omission caused the loss of chance 
rather than proving the act or omission caused the physical injury, a much more 
difficult question of causation.  Professor King advocates a proportional damage 
approach that compensates an injured victim in proportion to their loss, whether that 
loss is a 1% or 99% loss of chance.73  Professor King suggests that preexisting 
conditions should be taken into account when valuing the interest destroyed.  
Professor King would apply this approach broadly, including a reduction in damages 
to reflect preexisting conditions in cases where a defendant tortiously and directly 
causes physical injuries unrelated to the victim’s preexisting condition.74  A review 
of the cases which Professor King himself cites as adopting this approach reveal that 
                                                          
“[a]lthough the plaintiff still has the burden of persuading the jury by a preponderance of the 
evidence that defendant brought about the harm plaintiff has suffered, the jury, rather than the 
medical expert is given the task of balancing the probabilities.” Id.  However, as an indication 
of the confusion Roberts has created, Professor King, focusing on how the Ohio Supreme 
Court holds damages should be valued in loss-of-chance cases, cites Roberts as an example of 
the application of the loss-of-chance approach as opposed to the relaxed proof approach. See 
King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 508.  
71Many courts that have adopted the loss-of-chance doctrine have relied on this article. 
See, e.g., Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 483-84 (citing King, Valuation, supra note 33).  In 1998, 
Professor King updated his views and provided some guidelines for when he feels it is 
appropriate to apply the loss-of-chance doctrine. See King, Reformulation, supra note 7.  
Some commentators refer to this approach as the “King Approach.” See, e.g., Reuscher, supra 
note 66, at 778. 
72See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 508-09. 
73See King, Valuation, supra note 33, at 1372-73 and 1381-87. 
74See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 543. King states:  
A special relationship, undertaking, or other basis supporting a preexisting duty should 
not be required when a defendant’s active tortious conduct is proven to have probably 
caused a materialized injury, and the only question is to what extent to reduce 
damages for that injury to reflect the fact that the victim suffered from a preexisting 
condition creating a possibility of harm independent of the tortious conduct.  For 
example, the doctrine should be applied to a situation in which an ambulance 
transporting the victim to the hospital is struck by an eighteen-wheeler negligently 
operated by the defendant, and the victim was immediately killed.  The fact that prior 
to the accident the victim was having a heart attack and had only a forty percent 
likelihood of surviving should not, under the loss-of-a-chance doctrine, completely 
preclude damages for the value of the victim’s life.  Instead, it would call for an 
appropriate reduction to reflect the effect of the preexisting condition on the interest 
destroyed by the negligent operation of the truck.  
Id.  
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they have not fully adopted the “pure loss-of-chance” approach.75  In Roberts, the 
Ohio Supreme Court approvingly cited Professor King’s article and adopted a 
proportional approach to valuing the loss of a less than even chance of recovery or 
survival; however, it is not clear Roberts agrees with Professor King’s definition of 
the injury or application of the doctrine in cases where the plaintiff initially had a 
greater than 50% chance of survival.76 
E.  Limited Scope of Loss-of-Chance Doctrine 
Some scholars fear that the loss-of-chance doctrine is broad enough to swallow 
up traditional negligence in any case of questionable causation.77  The practical 
reality is, however, that the loss-of-chance doctrine is limited almost exclusively to 
medical malpractice cases,78 and this reality is not likely to change.  The reasons for 
this involve both economic and policy considerations. In a 1997 article Professor 
David Robertson notes: 
[The historically] ‘protective attitude of the law toward the medical 
[defendant]’ and a strong judicial tradition of deference to medical 
                                                                
75See King, Reformulation, supra note 6, at 560 n.58. Professor King cites the following 
cases as approving the loss-of-chance approach for some type of injuries: Delaney, 873 P.2d at 
185; Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 592 (Nev. 1991); Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 
484.  In Perez, the Supreme Court of Nevada adopted the loss-of-chance approach in a 
medical malpractice case where the decedent patient had less than a 50% chance of survival 
before the defendant’s negligence.  See Perez, 805 P.2d at 592.  The court held the amount of 
damages was “equal to the percent of chance [of survival] lost [due to negligence] multiplied 
by the total amount of damages which are ordinarily allowed in a wrongful death action.”  Id. 
at 592 (quoting McKellips, 741 P.2d at 476).  The court defined the injury as not the death 
itself, but rather as the decreased chance of survival caused by the medical malpractice.  See 
id. at 592.  By defining the injury in this manner, the traditional rule of preponderance is fully 
satisfied if the plaintiff can show, “to a reasonable medical probability, that some negligent act 
or omission by health care providers reduced a substantial chance of survival.”  Id. at 592.  
The court declined to clarify what percentage reduction amounted to a substantial chance, but 
doubted that a ten percent chance of survival would be actionable.  See id. at 592.  The court 
made a very important point by noting “in cases where the chances of survival were modest, 
plaintiffs will have little monetary incentive to bring a case to trial because damages would be 
drastically reduced to account for the preexisting condition.”  See Perez, 805 P.2d at 592. 
76See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 484-85; see also discussion, supra note 6 (discussing 
differences between King’s approach and Roberts). 
77See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 12, at 605 (noting that the theory has a vastly broad 
potential application to virtually every questionable case of causation, but cautioning that it 
would be unwise to apply the doctrine so broadly that it would replace traditional causation 
rules); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 26 REPORTERS’ NOTE cmt. n 
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002) (noting that the lost-opportunity development has been halting 
as courts have sought to find appropriate limits for this reconceptualization of legally 
cognizable harm; and without limits, this reform is of potentially enormous scope, implicating 
a large swath of tortious conduct in which there is uncertainty about factual cause, including 
failures to warn, provide rescue or safety equipment, and otherwise take precautions to protect 
a person from a risk of harm that exists).   
78See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 26 REPORTERS’ NOTE 
cmt. n (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002). 
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expertise led virtually all courts considering the problem [of the cause-in-
fact burden on the plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit] to say that 
expert testimony that proper medical treatment ‘would have increased the 
patient’s chance [of achieving a better medical result] from, for example, 
twenty to forty percent’ could not satisfy the plaintiff’s cause-in-fact 
burden.79   
Professor Robertson notes, however, that judicial attitudes regarding these 
matters have changed, leading to the loss-of-chance approach in medical 
malpractice.80  That same historical deference, however, has not been extended to 
areas beyond medical malpractice.  In a 1956 article, Professor Wex Malone 
discussed the degree of proof of causation required by courts.81  He noted that where 
the rule of conduct was designed to protect against the exact risk to which the 
plaintiff was exposed, courts were likely to let plaintiffs get to the jury on a minimal 
showing of causation,82 even when chances of rescue appeared slim;83 in these cases 
policy considerations of fairness, full compensation to accident victims, and 
deterrence favor a relaxed causation approach toward plaintiffs. 84 
In addition to these policy reasons, strong economic considerations limit the use 
of loss-of-chance doctrine.  Because the kinds of physical injury situations that 
implicate loss-of-chance are those in which courts already give plaintiffs a drastically 
reduced burden of proof,85 plaintiffs would have little reason to invoke the loss-of-
chance doctrine if it would have the effect of reducing their damages based on the 
percentage of lost opportunity when the alternative under the relaxed causation 
approach affords them full damages.86  Additionally, plaintiffs will rarely have the 
ability to provide expert testimony on the percentage of opportunity lost, as this type 
of information rarely exists outside the arena of medical malpractice.  These reasons 
may explain why courts and practitioners have only applied the loss-of-chance 
theory to medical malpractice. 
                                                                
79See Robertson, supra note 9, at 1784 (quoting from Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on 
Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 86 (1956)). 
80See Robertson, supra note 9, at 1784-85.  
81See Malone, supra note 79, at 72-77. 
82See id. 
83See id.; see also Zinnel, 10 F.2d 47 (holding question of ship owner’s liability for failure 
to properly maintain safety ropes and rescue a seaman that fell overboard and drowned should 
be submitted to a jury).   
84See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 54.  
85See Fischer, supra note 12, at 652. 
86See generally Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465 (Cal. 1970); McMullen, 725 
N.E.2d 1117. 
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F.  Loss-of-Chance in Ohio After Roberts 
1.  Statement of the Case in Roberts 
In Roberts,87 the plaintiff-appellant, executor of the patient-decedent’s estate, 
brought a wrongful death suit against the defendants, which included an HMO, a 
physician, and a hospital, for failure timely to diagnose and treat the victim’s lung 
cancer.88  The plaintiff alleged a seventeen-month delay in the diagnosis and 
treatment of the cancer.89  Expert testimony established that, even with timely 
diagnosis and treatment, the victim had only a 28% chance of survival and 
recovery.90  The plaintiff, relying on the loss-of-chance theory, argued the 
defendant’s negligence decreased the decedent’s chance of survival from 28% to 0%, 
and thus established a triable issue of fact.91  The trial court granted defendant’s 
summary judgment motion relying on the authority of Cooper.92  In Cooper,93 Ohio 
rejected the loss-of-chance theory in favor of the traditional causation requirement 
that a result was more likely than not caused by the defendant’s act.94   
2.  Statement of the Holding in Roberts. 
In overruling Cooper, the Roberts court joined the majority of states and adopted 
the loss-of-chance doctrine. 95 The court stated:  
                                                                
87Roberts, 668 N.E.2d 480. 
88See id. at 481. 
89See id. 
90See id. 
91See id. 
92See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 481 (citing Cooper, 272 N.E.2d 97). 
93Cooper, 272 N.E.2d 97, overruled by Roberts, 668 N.E.2d 480.  
94In Cooper, the court stated: 
In an action for wrongful death, where medical malpractice is alleged as the proximate 
cause of death, and plaintiff’s evidence indicates that a failure to diagnose the injury 
prevented the patient from an opportunity to be operated on, which failure eliminated 
any chance of the patient’s survival, the issue of proximate cause can be submitted to a 
jury only if there is sufficient evidence showing that with proper diagnosis, treatment 
and surgery the patient probably would have survived. 
Id. at 104. 
95See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 481, overruling Cooper, 272 N.E.2d 97.  The court stated: 
[W]e recognize that our court has traditionally acted as the embodiment of justice and 
fundamental fairness. Rarely does the law present so clear an opportunity to correct an 
unfair situation as does this case before us. The time has come to discard the 
traditionally harsh view we previously followed and join the majority of states that 
have adopted the loss of chance theory. A patient who seeks medical assistance from a 
professional caregiver has the right to expect proper care and should be compensated 
for any injury caused by the caregiver’s negligence which has reduced his or her 
chance of survival…. Thus, a health care provider should not be insulated from 
liability where there is expert medical testimony showing that he or she reduced the 
patient’s chances of survival. Unfortunately, under the traditional view this is precisely 
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[W]e recognize the loss-of-chance theory and follow the approach set 
forth in Section 323, Restatement of Torts.  Under this view, we hold as 
follows: In order to maintain an action for the loss of a less-than-even 
chance of recovery or survival, the plaintiff must present expert medical 
testimony showing that the health care provider’s negligent act or 
omission increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff. It then becomes a jury 
question as to whether the defendant’s negligence was the cause of the 
plaintiff’s injury or death. Once this burden is met, the trier of fact may 
then assess the degree to which the plaintiff’s chances of recovery or 
survival have been decreased and calculate the appropriate measure of 
damages.  The plaintiff is not required to establish the lost chance of 
recovery or survival in an exact percentage in order for the matter to be 
submitted to the jury. Instead, the jury is to consider evidence of 
percentages of the lost chance in the assessment and apportionment of 
damages.96  
The court held that to determine the amount of damages the jury should consider 
expert testimony presented and determine the total amount of damages from the date 
of the alleged negligence; ascertain the percentage of the patient’s lost chance of 
survival or recovery; and multiply that percentage by the total amount of damages.97  
The court provides the following illustration of how damages should be calculated: 
                                                          
the outcome…. We can no longer condone this view and consequently overrule 
Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc. 
Id. at 484. 
96Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 484. 
97See id. at 481, 484-85 (citing as rational the proportional damage approach advocated in 
King, Valuation, supra note 33, at 1381-1387, and the approach taken by the courts in 
Delaney, 873 P.2d at 186-87; McKellips, 741 P.2d at 475-76).   
A problem with this approach in determining damages is in what appears to be its 
exclusive reliance on expert testimony concerning the percentage of the patient’s lost chance.  
See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 484.  Assume a hypothetical case where the decedent was 
suffering under the effects of a life threatening preexisting condition and all parties 
acknowledge the defendant, a health care provider with whom the victim had a special 
relationship under Section 323, was negligent (i.e., expert testimony establishes the applicable 
standard of care and that the defendant breached that standard). Assume further that the 
percentage of lost chance is unknowable and no expert can be persuaded to provide testimony 
as to a statistical probability as to the loss-of-chance.  The outcome of such a case under 
Roberts is unclear.  
Roberts specifically states that the plaintiff is not required to establish the lost chance in an 
exact percentage in order for the matter to go to the jury.  See id.  Roberts did hold, however, 
that to determine the amount of damages, the jury should consider expert testimony presented 
and determine the total amount of damages from the date of the alleged negligence; ascertain 
the percentage of the patient’s lost chance of survival or recovery; and multiply that 
percentage by the total amount of damages.  See id.  Even if the jury found that the 
defendant’s omission was the cause of the injury or death, how are they to handle the fact that 
no expert will place a figure on the percentage of the patient’s lost chance?  The court has not 
ruled on a case like this; however, in Roberts, the discussion and the sole illustration of how 
damages should be computed implies the court would not award damages in such a case 
because of the lack of definitive statistical probability put forth by experts.  See id.  This result 
would be counter to fundamental tort policies of fairness, compensating victims, and 
deterrence.  See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 54.   
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To illustrate … where the jury determines from statistical findings 
combined with the specific facts relevant to the patient [that] the patient 
originally had a 40% chance of cure and the physician’s negligence 
reduced the chance of cure to 25%, (40%-25%) 15% represents the 
patient’s loss of survival. If the total amount of damages proved by the 
evidence is $500,000, the damages caused by the defendant is [sic] 15% x 
$500,000 or $75,000.98  
The Roberts court made clear that it was adopting the loss-of-chance doctrine in 
medical malpractice cases.  The problem is that the holding does not clearly tell us 
what the injury is nor does it tell us what standard of causation the trier of fact must 
apply. 
III. THE “INJURY VS. CAUSATION” DILEMMA  
Part III.A outlines the problem created by the different ways of approaching the 
loss-of-chance doctrine and Part III.B illustrates the confusion and uncertainty 
surrounding the doctrine in Ohio courts.  Since Roberts was decided in 1996, courts, 
practitioners, and commentators have had an opportunity to evaluate various 
approaches to the loss-of-chance doctrine.99  Part III.C analyzes the problems created 
by the Roberts decision and proposes recommendations for resolving the problems.  
Specifically, this Note suggests the doctrine be clarified in two ways.  First, the 
injury in loss-of-chance cases should be clearly defined as the lost chance itself.  
Second, the doctrine should clearly require a plaintiff meet the traditional standard of 
proving causation by a preponderance of the evidence.  These recommendations do 
not advocate overruling Roberts or changing the doctrine; rather they are directed at 
                                                          
Professor Robertson has observed that “once we know [the defendant] has caused some 
harm, we need not worry overmuch about making him pay too much.”  See Robertson, supra 
note 9, at 1794.  Judge Posner also reminds us not to forget the difference between the cause-
in-fact issue and the damage issue and has written, “a tort plaintiff’s burden of proving the 
extent of his injury is not a heavy one.  Doubts are resolved against the tortfeasor.”  DePass v. 
United States, 721 F.2d. 203, 209 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J., dissenting).  Concerns over 
equitable treatment of defendants and basing their liability on their proportional fault must be 
considered in light of the fact that the plaintiff did not bargain for, nor knowingly submit to, 
the increased risk the defendant’s negligence exposed him to. Rather, the victim relied on the 
defendant to protect him from the very harm that has occurred. In fact, lack of statistics aside, 
the reason we do not know more definitively whether the preexisting condition would have 
taken the victim’s life is because the defendant’s tortious conduct removed any chance we 
would have of knowing whether a more favorable outcome would have come to pass.  While 
that chance cannot be reduced to a specific statistical probability, all would agree it had 
substantial value to the victim and his family.  Under these circumstances, as a practical 
matter, requiring a plaintiff to prove something that cannot be proven should not be required.  
It is worth recalling Justice Frankfurter’s admonition that “there comes a point where this 
Court should not be ignorant as judges of what we know as men.”  Watts v. State of Ind., 338 
U.S. 49, 52 (1949).  Under these circumstances we should rely on the jury to apply their 
judgment, experience and knowledge of the community in arriving at a fair assessment of the 
damages.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. b (1965).  
98Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 485.   
99See, e.g., McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 725 N.E.2d 1117 (Ohio 2000); King, 
Reformulation, supra note 6; Fischer, supra note 12, See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 26 REPORTERS’ NOTE cmt. n (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002). 
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creating a brighter line approach (i.e. clarifying the doctrine and how it should be 
applied).  These proposals should have the beneficial effects of fostering 
predictability and eliminating arbitrariness by courts in their interpretations of the 
doctrine and juries in their evaluation of causation of a previously ill-defined injury.  
Part III.C then evaluates these proposals considering the cases and authorities cited 
by the Roberts court.  Finally, Part III.D responds to the anticipated 
counterarguments to the proposals advocated in Part III.C.  
A.  The Theoretical Problem  
The doctrinal problem of compensating lost chances could be approached in two 
ways: it could be approached by relaxing the traditional causation requirement, or by 
defining the lost chance itself as a separate, compensable injury.  Different legal 
consequences follow depending on which option is chosen.   
It remains unclear under Roberts which choice is now the law of Ohio, and the 
lower courts have accordingly come to some conflicting conclusions.  From a policy 
standpoint, the lack of a clear definition of the injury in a loss-of-chance case and 
causation requirements results in: (1) inefficiency in the courts; (2) a lack of clear 
standards for juries in determining whether a plaintiff has satisfied their burden of 
proving causation; and (3) arbitrariness and unfairness to both plaintiffs and 
defendants alike as it becomes a matter of chance as to how a court will interpret 
Roberts and how a jury will respond lacking clear guidance from the court.   
B. The Significance of the Theoretical Problem, as Shown by Confusion  
in Lower Ohio Court Cases Decided under Roberts  
Conflicting decisions and views in cases decided after Roberts demonstrate the 
confusion Roberts has created as to: (1) what standard of proof is required to prove 
causation; and (2) how to define the injury in a loss-of-chance case. 
1.  Standard of Proof Requirements.  
A review of cases decided since Roberts indicates that Ohio courts have not 
exactly agreed on how Roberts should be applied.  In Starkey v. St. Rita’s Med. 
Ctr.,100 the court cites Roberts for the proposition that under the loss-of-chance 
doctrine, the plaintiff need not prove, through a medical expert, that the injury was 
more likely than not caused by the defendant’s negligence although the plaintiff still 
has the burden of persuading the jury by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant brought about the harm the plaintiff has suffered.101  In Starkey, the court 
overturned a judgment for the defendant because it could not determine whether the 
jury found that the defendant was simply not negligent, or was negligent, but the 
plaintiff failed to prove causation by a reasonable probability (because under 
Roberts, the plaintiffs no longer have to prove causation by a reasonable probability 
                                                                
100690 N.E.2d 57 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). 
101See id. at 62.  The Starkey court does not address the issue of whether the injury is the 
loss of chance or the physical result of the defendant’s acts or omissions, rather the court 
focuses on the standard of causation that the plaintiff must prove. 
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standard).102  It is far from clear what standard of proof this court feels a plaintiff 
must meet.103  
In Paul v. Metrohealth St. Lukes Med. Ctr.,104 a wrongful death action based on 
medical malpractice, the plaintiff’s expert testified that, within a reasonable degree 
of medical probability, the care provided to the plaintiff by the defendant fell below 
the accepted standard of care and that the hospital staff should have acted 
immediately when the victim began experiencing seizures.105  The court upheld a 
judgment in favor of the defendant and held that the plaintiff’s expert failed to 
demonstrate that defendant’s alleged medical malpractice was the proximate cause to 
a degree of medical certainty or medical probability as required by Roberts.106  
Further, the court held that Roberts does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of 
proving “but-for” causation and that the plaintiff failed to establish a probable causal 
link between the defendant’s actions and the resulting harm to the decedent.107  This 
court appears to have reached an entirely different conclusion than the Starkey court 
as to what Roberts requires a plaintiff to prove.  In Paul, the court, by defining the 
injury as the death and requiring the plaintiff to meet a “but-for” causation standard, 
has placed a greater burden on the plaintiff to establish causation than appears to be 
called for by Roberts.108 
2.  Defining the Injury. 
In Shockey v. Our Lady of Mercy Mariemont,109 a medical malpractice case, the 
court stated, “the decision in Roberts did not so much change the law of causation … 
as it recognized a new compensable harm. [Here the plaintiff] did not assert that this 
harm—the loss of a chance of recovery—occurred.”110  This interpretation of Roberts 
appears to define the injury as the loss of chance and not the physical harm. 
In McMullen v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp.,111 a majority of the Ohio Supreme Court 
concluded the loss-of-chance doctrine did not apply where negligence of hospital 
personnel directly caused the ultimate harm to the patient and decided the case based 
on traditional negligence principles.112  Justice Resnick, in dicta discussing the loss-
                                                                
102See id. at 63. 
103See supra Part II.D.2. 
104No. 71195, 1998 WL 742173, at *1 (8th Dist. Ohio App. Oct. 22, 1998). 
105See id. at *15. 
106See id. at *7. 
107Id.  
108See supra Part II.F. 
109No. C-960492, 1997 WL 346104, at *1 (1st Dist. Ohio Ct. App. June 25, 1997). 
110Id. at *3. 
111McMullen, 725 N.E.2d 1117 (Ohio 2000). 
112See id. at 1124-25.  For a thorough discussion of the holding and impact of this case see 
Jason Perkins, Note, McMullen v. Ohio State University Hospitals: Legal Recovery for 
Terminally Ill and Injured Patients Without the Lost Chance Doctrine, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 451 
(2001); see also Reuscher, supra note 66. 
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of-chance doctrine, gave some insight into her view concerning the injury in loss-of-
chance when she stated “[t]he focus then shifts away from the cause of the ultimate 
harm itself, and is directed instead on the extent to which the defendant’s negligence 
caused a reduction in the victim’s likelihood of achieving a more favorable 
outcome.”113  This implied that Justice Resnick felt the injury was the ultimate 
physical injury and not the loss-of-chance itself. However, in his dissent, Chief 
Justice Moyer described the injury in loss-of-chance cases as “the injury of having 
been deprived of a chance of a more favorable ultimate result.”114  Further, Chief 
Justice Moyer touched on the causation standard under Roberts when he stated:  
Accordingly, in lost chance cases, those plaintiffs who are unable to meet 
the “but for” test (that the full extent of their injuries would not have 
occurred but for negligence on the part of medical providers) are not 
completely barred from recovery. Rather, they receive damages in 
proportion to the percentage of chance of recovery of which they were 
deprived.115  
Under this view, a plaintiff does not have to meet the “but for” causation standard.  
This seems to contradict the view of the Ohio Court of Appeals in Paul, which 
requires a plaintiff to prove “but for” causation as to the ultimate injury.116 
C.  Proposed Solution: Consider Loss of Chance a Compensable “Injury” in 
 Medical Malpractice cases and Require Plaintiffs Prove Causation by a 
Preponderance 
1. The Injury Suffered in a Loss-of-Chance Should be Defined as the  
Lost Chance Itself. 
Determining the injury is critical because the trier of fact cannot answer the 
question of causation unless it knows which injury the defendant’s act or omission is 
said to have caused.  If the injury is the ultimate physical harm (e.g., death or 
physical disability), then the causation question is whether the defendant’s negligent 
act caused the death or disability.  Alternatively, the causation question is much 
clearer for the trier of fact if the injury is defined as the loss-of-chance itself.117  In 
the latter case, a plaintiff need prove only that it was more likely than not that the 
defendant’s negligence caused the loss-of-chance.118 
 The majority in Roberts does not clearly define the injury.  However, both Chief 
Justice Moyer and Justice Cook acknowledge the issue of identifying the injury in 
                                                                
113McMullen, 725 N.E.2d at 1123 (emphasis added). 
114Id. at 1128 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). 
115Id. 
116See Paul, No. 71195, 1998 WL 742173, at *7.   
117See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 9, at 1785; Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 479-87 (Pearson, J., 
concurring). 
118See, e.g., Robertson, supra note 9; Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 479-87 (Pearson, J., 
concurring); Truckor, supra note 66, at 358. 
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their dissenting opinions in Roberts.119  Chief Justice Moyer argues that the holding 
of the case goes beyond wrongful death cases and creates a new common law cause 
of action for loss-of-chance noting that the holding makes it a “jury question as to 
whether the defendant’s negligence was a cause of the plaintiff’s injury or death.”120  
Justice Cook, in dissenting, notes that the injury and the basis of the claim in loss-of-
chance cases, in some jurisdictions, is “the reduced possibility of survival, and not 
the death itself.”121  
The majority in Roberts cite a number of cases from other jurisdictions in support 
of the decision; however, this only adds to the confusion because the cases are not in 
agreement as to whether the injury is the physical harm or the discrete injury of the 
loss-of-chance itself.122  The majority also cites Professor King’s article, discussed 
above, in which he advocates the loss-of-chance itself as a legally compensable 
interest.123  While the majority has not clearly adopted King’s position, they did 
adopt his proportional damage approach124 to ascertaining the amount of damages 
recoverable.125  
Professor King126 and a plurality of the Washington Supreme Court in Herskovits 
v. Group Health Co-op of Puget Sound,127 have defined the injury as the loss-of-
chance itself.  The benefit of defining the injury in this manner is that it establishes a 
bright-line test, promotes efficiency and fairness, and logically connects the injury to 
the valuation of damages as set forth by the court in Roberts.  Defining the injury as 
the physical harm creates uncertainty and unfairness due to confusion over causation. 
2.  The Plaintiff Should be Required to Prove Causation by Traditional 
Preponderance Standards.128  
The syllabus in Roberts states: 
In order to maintain an action for the loss of a less-than-even chance of 
recovery or survival, the plaintiff must present expert medical testimony 
showing that the health care provider’s negligent act or omission 
increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff. It then becomes a jury question 
                                                                
119See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 485-86 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting and Cook, J., separately 
dissenting). 
120See id. at 485 (emphasis in original).  In his dissent in McMullen, Chief Justice Moyer, 
citing Roberts, once again implied the injury in loss-of-chance is not the death itself, rather it 
is the “injury of having been deprived of a chance of a more favorable ultimate result.” 
McMullen, 725 N.E.2d at 1128 (Moyer, C.J., dissenting). 
121Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 486 (Cook, J., dissenting). 
122See, e.g., Herskovits, 664 N.W.2d at 474-87, for the best illustration of this conflict. 
123See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 483-84 (citing King, Valuation, supra note 33, at 1353-54).  
124See King, Valuation, supra note 33, at 1372-73 and 1381-87. 
125See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 484 (citing King, Valuation, supra note 33, at 1381-87). 
126See King, Valuation, supra note 33, at 1353-54. 
127See Herskovits, 664 P.2d at 479-87 (Pearson, J., concurring). 
128For an excellent discussion of cause in fact see Robertson, supra note 9. 
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as to whether the defendant’s negligence was the cause of the plaintiff’s 
injury or death.129 
This statement is not a bright-line rule; rather it appears to leave the question to 
the jury to decide whether the defendant caused the injury or death. By what standard 
is the jury to determine causation?  If the answer is by a preponderance, the question 
remains - what is the injury?  If the injury is the ultimate physical injury and the 
standard to be applied is the preponderance, how then is the jury ever to reach a 
conclusion that it was more likely than not that a defendant caused the death of a 
victim with a 40% chance of survival before the defendant’s negligence and a 25% 
chance after the negligence?130  This would be illogical since Roberts requires the 
jury to consider expert testimony in ascertaining the percentage of the patient’s lost 
chance of survival or recovery in calculating damages.131  For a jury to find a 
defendant liable in this situation would require it to find it more likely than not that 
the defendant caused the ultimate physical injury, but that the chance of survival or 
recovery was already less than 50%.  Such a finding is contradictory on its face.  
In adopting the loss of less-than-even chance of survival rule stated above, the 
Roberts court states that it is following the approach set forth in Section 323, 
Restatement of Torts.132  The court cites Herskovits133 and Hamil v. Bashline134 as 
examples of courts that apply Section 323 and standing for the proposition that: 
[O]nce the plaintiff proves that the defendant has increased the risk of 
harm by depriving the patient of a chance to recover, the case can go to 
the jury on the issue of causation regardless of whether the plaintiff could 
prove to a degree of medical probability that the defendant caused the 
patient’s injury or death.135  
The court implies that Section 323 is an alternative to the “substantial possibility” 
causation standard in Hicks.136  Causation requirements for cases falling under 
Section 323, and the cases cited by the court in Roberts, are generally regarded by 
commentators as falling into the category of “relaxed proof of causation.” 137  The 
“relaxed causation” approach generally takes the underlying injury (i.e., patient’s 
death or physical disability) as the injury for which the patient is compensated and 
allows the question to go to the jury with less than a normal threshold of proof.138  
                                                                
129Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 481 syllabus n.1. 
130This is the illustration used by the court in Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 485. 
131See id. at 481 syllabus n.3. 
132See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 484. 
133Herskovits, 664 P.2d 474. 
134392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978). 
135Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 483. 
136See id. at 482-83 (citing Hicks, 368 F.2d 626). 
137See cases and articles cited supra notes 56-69. 
138See id. 
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There are several problems with the court’s reliance on Section 323 and these 
cases. Section 323 provides: 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services 
to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of 
the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical 
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his 
undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of 
such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon 
the undertaking.139 
The Reporters’ Note to Section 26 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts discusses 
the fact that a number of courts adopting a lost-opportunity version of harm have 
relied on Section 323.140  As the reporter points out: 
This reliance on § 323 is misplaced.  Section 323 is contained in Chapter 
12, which addresses the general principles of a negligence claim. Its 
placement in Topic 7, entitled ‘Duties of Affirmative Action,’ reveals that 
it addresses the question of the existence of a duty and its scope for a 
person who undertakes to protect another from harm. The Second 
Restatement addresses causal matters in Chapter 16, The Causal Relation 
Necessary to Responsibility for Negligence, in §§ 430-461.141  
As the above discussion makes clear, Section 323 deals with the duty and breach 
elements of negligence and not causation.142  Relying on a Section 323 approach to 
causation is misplaced because Section 323 does not address causation.   
Even when Section 323 applies,143 causation must still be proven according to the 
traditional rules of negligence.144  In a situation to which Section 323 applies, the 
                                                                
139RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965). 
140See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 26 REPORTERS’ NOTE 
cmt. n (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002). 
141RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 26 REPORTERS’ NOTE cmt. n 
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).  
142See KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, at 164-65.   
143Courts that have adopted Section 323 have not necessarily agreed on how the jury 
should be instructed when Section 323 applies. Compare Thompson, 688 P.2d 605 (holding 
that the jury in medical malpractice cases should be allowed to consider an increase in the 
chance of harm on the issue of causation, but this did not mean the jury should be instructed 
under the Restatement rule, rather the Restatement rule merely allows the court to permit 
evidence of increased risk of harm and the jury must still be instructed to decide in favor of the 
defendant unless it finds it probable that the defendant was a cause of the plaintiff’s injury), 
with DeBurkarte v. Louvar 393 N.W.2d 131 (Iowa 1986) (upholding jury instructions in a 
medical malpractice case that permitted the jury to award damages based on a finding that the 
defendant’s tortious conduct increased the risk of harm to the victim by depriving her of an 
opportunity to receive timely treatment, but did not permit the jury to find that the defendant 
caused the victim’s imminent death), and with Jones v. Montefiore Hospital, 431 A.2d 920 
(Pa. 1981) (finding that a plaintiff was entitled to an instruction based on Section 323 and that 
proximate cause could be established by evidence that the defendant’s negligent act or 
omission was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm suffered by the plaintiff).   
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negligence is frequently an omission (e.g., a failure to act to protect the injured party 
from some other force).  In such cases the other force (e.g., a preexisting medical 
condition or a storm that washes a seaman overboard) is what causes the ultimate 
physical injury; consequently, as the drafters of the second Restatement themselves 
observe, we will almost always be unable to say with certainty that the failure to act 
caused the ultimate injury.145  Such cases will always involve an analysis of what 
might have happened if the alleged tortfeasor had acted with reasonable care; the 
loss-of-chance is the very thing that might have happened.  As discussed in Part II.E, 
policy considerations have historically led courts to allow non-medical cases to reach 
a jury upon a minimal showing of causation146 (e.g., the seaman who drowns due to 
negligent safety precautions or rescue efforts).147  In the non-medical cases, courts 
have often held that if the matter was within the common experience of the 
community, and was a question in which reasonable minds could differ, then the jury 
was capable of balancing the equities.148  If they found in favor of the plaintiff, he 
was awarded full damages.149   
The policies that courts consider in reducing the plaintiff’s causation burden in 
non-medical cases do not apply to medical malpractice cases.  Loss-of-chance in the 
medical malpractice context is different than non-medical cases for at least two 
reasons.  First, medical malpractice is not normally within the common experience of 
the community.  Second, in the non-medical case, the victim’s chance of avoiding 
the adverse consequence in the absence of the defendant’s negligence is generally 
unknowable.  In the loss of a less-than-even chance of recovery or survival in the 
medical malpractice situation, the victim’s chance of survival, by definition, is less 
                                                          
144See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. b (1965) (addressing burden of 
proof).  The Restatement states: 
The plaintiff is not however, required to prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt.  He 
is not required to eliminate entirely all possibility that the defendant’s conduct was not 
a cause.  It is enough that he introduces evidence from which reasonable men may 
conclude that it is more probable that the event was caused by the defendant than that 
it was not.  The fact of causation is incapable of mathematical proof, since no man can 
say with absolute certainty what would have occurred if the defendant had acted 
otherwise.  If, as a matter of ordinary experience, a particular act or omission might be 
expected to produce a particular result, and if that result has in fact followed, the 
conclusion may be justified that the causal relation exists.  In drawing that conclusion, 
the triers of fact are permitted to draw upon ordinary human experience as to the 
probabilities of the case.  Thus when a child is drowned in a swimming pool, no one 
can say with absolute certainty that a lifeguard would have saved him; but the 
common experience of the community permits the conclusion that the guard would 
more probably than not have done so, and hence that the absence of the guard has 
played a substantial part in bringing about the death of the child.  Such questions are 
normally for the jury, and the court may seldom rule on them as matters of law.   
Id. 
145See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B cmt. b (1965).  
146See discussion supra Part II.D.2. 
147See Zinnel, 10 F.2d 47. 
148See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B cmt. b (1965). 
149See Fischer, supra note 12, at 652. 
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than 50% before the negligent act or omission. However, even if a patient’s chances 
are less than 50%, advances in medical technology mean patients can often survive 
diseases and injuries they could never have survived just a few years earlier; 
frequently these favorable outcomes can be demonstrated statistically.  Lay jurors 
may understand this intuitively, but are still not likely to be in a position to conclude 
that malpractice caused the adverse consequence.  Assisted by expert testimony, lay 
jurors can apply their judgment and make a determination whether the malpractice 
caused the injury of the loss of chance itself.  Under these circumstances, there 
should be no need to relax the causation standards.  The focus of causation should 
not be on the ultimate physical harm, but instead upon the lost opportunity, which 
can be established through expert testimony and frequently reduced to statistical 
probabilities.150  Since proximate causation is almost never an issue in loss-of-chance 
cases,151 if the plaintiff can prove that it is more likely than not that but-for the 
defendant’s negligence the injury of the loss-of-chance itself would not have 
occurred, then the only remaining question should be the amount of damages.152  
The Roberts court cites Hamil153 and Herskovits154 as two cases in support of its 
approach to applying Section 323 to loss-of-chance.155  Important differences exist, 
however, between the holdings in these cases and the approach adopted by the 
Roberts court.   
In Hamil, the court clearly defined the injury as the ultimate physical harm 
suffered, not merely the loss-of-chance.156  By contrast, the Roberts court did not 
define the injury as the ultimate physical harm.157  Further, the Hamil court gave no 
indication that the damages should be reduced to reflect the percentage of lost 
opportunity.158  The Roberts court, on the other hand, clearly adopted the 
proportional approach to valuing the loss of a less than even chance of recovery or 
survival.159  Because the plaintiff in Hamil arguably demonstrated that the victim lost 
                                                                
150This Note is not advocating that the doctrine should only apply to medical malpractice 
cases when it can be proven through the use of statistical probabilities.  However, statistics are 
useful in many cases, particularly as a factor in ascertaining damages. See supra note 97. 
151See supra Part II.B. 
152See Robertson, supra note 9. 
153Hamil, 392 A.2d 1280. In Hamil, the alleged medical malpractice was the defendant’s 
failure to properly diagnose and treat the plaintiff’s condition in a manner that might have 
prevented the harm.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted Section 323 to relax the 
degree of certainty normally required of plaintiff’s evidence. See id. at 1286.  Once the 
plaintiff has introduced evidence that a defendant’s negligent act or omission increased the 
risk of harm to the plaintiff, and that harm was in fact sustained, it becomes a jury question 
whether or not the increased risk was a substantial factor in producing the harm. Id. at 1286.    
154Herskovits, 664 P.2d 474. 
155See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 483 (citing Hamil, 392 A. 2d 1280; Herskovits, 664 P.2d 
474). 
156See Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1286, n.5.  
157See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d 480. 
158See Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1282-83.  
159See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 484-85.   
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a greater than 50% chance of survival due to the defendant’s negligence, it is not 
clear how much, if at all, the Hamil court actually relaxed the standard of proof for 
causation.160  The court noted that the burden of proof necessary to warrant a jury 
verdict for the plaintiff is a preponderance of the evidence,161 and the jury, not the 
medical expert, has the task of balancing the probabilities.162  
Herskovits163 is another case cited by the court in Roberts as standing for the 
proposition that under Section 323, once the plaintiff proves that the defendant 
increased the risk of harm by depriving the patient of a chance to recover, the case 
can go to the jury on the issue of causation regardless of whether the plaintiff could 
prove to a degree of medical probability that the defendant caused the patient’s 
injury or death.164 
The problem with relying on Herskovits is that the majority of the Washington 
Supreme Court recognized the loss-of-chance doctrine, but they were split as to their 
reasoning.165  Two of the six justices in the majority held the view that the plaintiff 
proved that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s subsequent death because they 
                                                                
160In Hamil, the court stated that the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert was that there was 
a 75% chance of recovery had prompt treatment been rendered and this was a sufficient basis 
upon which the jury could have concluded that it was more likely than not that the defendant’s 
omissions were a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s death.  See Hamil, 392 A.2d at 
1288, n.9. 
161In Hamil, the court stated: 
The quantum of proof necessary to warrant a jury verdict for the plaintiff is … a 
preponderance of the evidence. This is made clear in Comment (a) to Section 433B of 
the Restatement: ‘a. Subsection (1) states the general rule (that burden of proof as to 
causation is on the plaintiff).  As on other issues in civil cases, the plaintiff is required 
to produce evidence that the conduct of the defendant has been a substantial factor in 
bringing about the harm he has suffered, and to sustain his burden of proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  This means that he must make it appear that it is more 
likely than not the conduct of the defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about 
the harm.  A mere possibility of such causation is not enough; and when the matter 
remains one of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly 
balanced, it becomes a duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant.’  
Hamil, 392 A.2d at 1288, n.9. 
162See id. at 1288. 
163Herskovits, 664 P.2d 474. 
164See Roberts, 668 N.E.2d at 483. 
165Herskovits, 664 P.2d 474, 474-87.  In Herskovits, the Washington Supreme Court 
concluded that recovery was proper on behalf of a plaintiff-decedent whose chances of 
surviving cancer had been reduced, according to expert testimony, from 39% to 25% as a 
result of the defendant’s medical malpractice.  See, id.  The majority was split with only two 
of the justices holding the view that the plaintiff proved the defendant caused the plaintiff’s 
subsequent death because they proved that the defendant’s negligent act was a substantial 
factor that increased the risk of death.  Id. at 474-79.  The remaining four justices on the 
majority took the view that, based on the expert testimony, the defendant’s negligence 
probably did not cause (under traditional requirements of establishing proximate cause) the 
decedent’s death and damages were not appropriate on that basis. Id. at 479-87 (Pearson, J., 
concurring).  However, these four justices felt that the loss of a less than even chance itself 
was an actionable injury.  Id. 
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proved that the defendant’s negligent act was a “substantial factor” that increased the 
risk of death.166  Concurring in the opinion, four of the justices took the view that, 
based on the expert testimony, the defendant’s negligence probably did not cause 
(under traditional requirements of establishing proximate cause) the decedent’s death 
and damages were not appropriate on that basis; however, these four justices felt that 
the loss of a less than even chance itself was an actionable injury.167  In concurring, 
Justice Pearson stated that “[u]nder this interpretation, a person will ‘cause’ the death 
of another person [within the meaning of the wrongful death statute] whenever he 
causes a substantial reduction in that person’s chance of survival.”168 
The Roberts court did not adopt the substantial factor test advocated by two of 
the justices in the majority in Herskovits, nor did they clearly state that they agreed 
with the four justices in the plurality.  There are several ways to interpret the Roberts 
court’s reliance on Herskovits.  Arguably, it could be fairly implied that the Roberts 
court did not so much relax causation standards as it redefined the injury (or perhaps 
relaxed the definition of the injury) as the lost chance itself.   
Ultimately, the problem we are left with is that the Roberts court did not provide 
a clear statement that resolves important questions concerning the injury and 
causation elements.  The cases cited, as well as the adoption of the proportional 
damages approach to valuing lost chances advocated by Professor King, by the 
Roberts court, however, make a strong argument for applying traditional notions of 
proving causation169 to an injury defined as the lost chance itself.  
D.  Counterarguments to the Proposed Solution 
Critics of this proposal to clarify the loss-of-chance doctrine may argue that this 
would be bad policy because it creates an economic incentive for plaintiffs to litigate 
and thus invites a flood of frivolous litigation.  The risk of frivolous litigation, 
however, is not unique to causes of action based on loss-of-chance.  Frivolous 
litigation is a cost of contingency fees and the American Rule, which generally 
prohibits recovery of legal fees by the prevailing party in litigation.170  The reality is 
that the decision in Roberts merely brings Ohio in line with the majority of 
jurisdictions throughout the country in recognizing a plaintiff’s right to recover for 
the tortious destruction of the loss-of-chance.  Given that plaintiffs can currently 
bring suit under the loss-of-chance doctrine, it is hard to see how clarifying the 
definition of the injury and standards of causation significantly adds to the risk that 
new plaintiffs will see this as an opportunity to initiate a frivolous suit.   
Critics may argue that because of loss-of-chance claims medical providers will 
either be driven out of the practice of medicine (or at least stay away from patients 
with preexisting conditions) or pass on the costs of higher malpractice insurance; 
either way, the results are higher healthcare costs for society.  To a certain degree 
these observations seem reasonable.  These criticisms, however, overlook several 
                                                                
166Id. at 474-79. 
167Id. at 479-87. 
168Id. 
169See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 26 cmt. n 
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points.  First, as discussed above, the loss-of-chance doctrine is already with us and it 
is not clear that clarifying certain aspects of the doctrine will add such significant 
costs that it would be an unfair burden on society. Second, this is really a criticism of 
the tort system in general, and medical malpractice in particular.  It would be unfair 
to single out the victims of loss-of-chance for harsher treatment than victims of other 
torts. 
It is also worth noting that recent studies show that medical malpractice causes 
more deaths each year than motor vehicle accidents,171 but the vast majority of these 
victims never pursue these medical malpractice cases.172  If one accepts the accuracy 
of these studies, it seems fair to conclude that most of the cost of malpractice is not 
borne by the tortfeasors themselves or society overall, but rather by individual 
victims of malpractice.  The real question we should ask is whether it is fair to make 
a victim of medical malpractice bear the entire cost of the injury.  Tort policies of 
deterrence, fairness, victim compensation, and loss spreading would seem to favor 
recovery even where the injury sustained is a lost chance.173  Concerns over the 
equitable treatment of a defendant in these cases must be considered in light of the 
fact that the victim did not bargain for, nor knowingly submit to, the increased risk 
that the defendant’s negligence exposed the victim to.  Rather, the victim relied on 
the defendant to protect the victim from the very harm that occurred.174  
Critics may also point out that current political trends indicate a strong desire for 
tort reform and a desire to cap damages by tort plaintiffs.175  These legislative 
initiatives, however, are not aimed at eliminating legitimate causes of action, but 
rather limiting excessive damage awards.176 The reality is that there is nothing 
inconsistent with this proposal to eliminate much of the uncertainty in the law 
concerning loss-of-chance and a cap on noneconomic damage awards.  Both 
proposals, if enacted, can peacefully coexist.  
Critics may argue that the transaction costs (i.e., legal fees, court costs, etc.) to 
defendants and society will in many cases exceed the total damages.  This criticism 
overlooks the economic reality on the plaintiff’s side.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers may be 
disinclined to take loss-of-chance cases on a contingency basis because damages are 
likely to be drastically reduced to reflect the loss-of-chance.177  In addition, plaintiffs 
will themselves incur the cost of obtaining expert testimony to establish causation 
and the applicable standard of care.  The economic reality is that many plaintiffs and 
their lawyers will frequently decline to take the economic risks associated with loss-
of-chance cases when the potential damages are not significant.  In addition, 
clarifying the law as proposed by this Note establishes a brighter line approach, and 
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174See supra note 97. 
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should have the beneficial effect of reducing resources expended by both lawyers 
and courts handling loss-of-chance cases.   
Another criticism is that the loss-of-chance doctrine could swallow up the 
traditional law of negligence because arguably the doctrine could be raised in 
virtually every case of tortious conduct involving questionable causation.178  As 
discussed in detail in Part II.E, the loss-of-chance doctrine has been applied almost 
exclusively in the context of medical malpractice.  Defining the injury in loss-of-
chance cases as the lost opportunity itself is not likely to cause courts to become less 
reluctant to allow the doctrine to be applied in nonmedical malpractice cases.  
Additionally, plaintiffs in non-malpractice cases have an incentive to use traditional 
negligence concepts of injury and causation because in non-malpractice cases 
causation requirements are already relaxed and by relying on traditional concepts 
plaintiffs can win full damages for the ultimate injury rather than proportionally 
reduced compensation for lost chances.179   
IV.  CONCLUSION  
The decision in Roberts was an important step by the Ohio Supreme Court in 
correcting a view that was unfair to victims of lost chances in medical malpractice 
cases. The decision, however, has created confusion and left unanswered some 
important questions.  Most importantly, in considering the case of a loss of a less-
than-even chance of recovery or survival, defining the injury as the lost chance itself 
is the fairest and most logical means of solving the fundamental problem of proving 
causation.  Importantly, it has the beneficial effect of retaining the traditional test for 
causation.180  This bright line approach fosters predictability and is less arbitrary than 
a relaxed causation approach.  Indeed, relaxed causation approaches are inherently 
illogical because they ask the jury to find it more likely than not that the defendant’s 
negligence caused a death or disability that there was already a less-than-even 
chance of avoiding.  Until either the state legislature or the Ohio Supreme Court 
addresses these problems, victims of medical malpractice cannot be certain of fair 
treatment in Ohio courts in the case of a loss of chance of recovery or survival. 
 
GEORGE J. ZILICH181 
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181Editor-in-Chief, Cleveland State Law Review. J.D. expected May 2004. The author is 
the father of Samuel J. Zilich whose tragic death in 1998 led the author on a journey through 
the tort worlds of causation and the loss-of-chance doctrine and inspired this article. 
29Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2003
